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Article 1

ARTICLES

THE CLASS ACTION RULE
John Bronsteen *
Owen Fisst
The class action has many uses. The most compelling occurs
when someone inflicts a small harm on each member of a large group
of people. In such a case, any one victim would have to spend more
money to hire a lawyer than he could recover by winning the lawsuit,
so he would not sue. The class action enables the claims of all the
individual victims to be aggregated, thereby spreading the lawsuit's
costs among all class members and creating a potential recovery that is
large enough to make the suit economically viable. Although each
individual who is harmed wins only a small amount, the public benefit
is substantial. The costs of the large public harm are borne by the
person or firm responsible for it, and incentives to commit future
transgressions are removed.
In this way, the class action provides for the private enforcement
of laws that are aimed at protecting the public. Yet it contains a risk: If
the named plaintiff loses in court, then all of the members of the class
have lost and cannot relitigate their claims. Some people who might
never even have known about the lawsuit and who certainly never participated in it will suddenly find themselves denied access to the court
system, on the theory that they were already represented by the
named plaintiffs who litigated the action on their behalf.
Admittedly, it is common for one individual to represent others
in a lawsuit, but those represented typically appoint their representative or at least consent to the representation. This ordinary form of
representation entails an agency relationship: It is premised on the
theory that the representative is acting as the agent of those he represents. In the class action, however, there is no consensual tie between
* Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law
School.
t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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the represented and the representative. In fact, the named plaintiff
appoints himself as representative of the class, and most of those represented do not know the representative or even that they are being
represented. Accordingly, in a class action the named plaintiff cannot
be said to be the agent of the class, but rather invokes another theory
of representation altogether-interest representation. The named
plaintiff represents the interests of the class.
Some might view the class action as entailing agency representation whenever class members are notified of the lawsuit and given an
opportunity to withdraw from the class. Under this theory, the failure
of a class member actively to withdraw from the suit is claimed to supply the requisite consent. But we should never treat inaction as a form
of consent when consent is not the most likely explanation for the
inaction. Consumed with matters that impinge on ordinary life, most
people throw out notice letters without reading them, much less understanding them. It would therefore be unreasonable to assume that
class members' failure to withdraw results from their considered
choice to be represented by the named plaintiffs. There is no consent
and no agency relationship in a class action, and as a consequence
interest representation is the only justification for conceiving class actions as representative lawsuits. Although the class action is often said
to be a substitute for joinder, it is not a form of joinder because the
members of the class do not participate in the suit in any meaningful
sense, nor have they chosen to be represented in the suit.
Some might seek to construct a consensual tie between the
named plaintiff and the members of the class by introducing the idea
of hypothetical consent: The claim is that the members of the class
would have consented to the representation if they were fully advised
of the suit and the consequences that flow from it. They have something to gain if the named plaintiff wins, and very little to lose if the
judgment goes the other way. Granted, the argument continues, they
will lose their chance to relitigate their individual claims, but in the
situation of dispersed harm-in many respects, the paradigm of the
class action-the dollar value of that claim is so small as to make the
possibility of ever prosecuting the claim remote. Yet hypothetical consent is not the same as consent.' We bind individuals to the representational arrangements to which they agreed as a way of holding them
responsible for the consequences of their considered choices; but because by definition there is no choice with hypothetical consent, it
1 See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, 40 U. Cii. L. REV. 500, 519-33
(1973).
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cannot be treated as the same as actual consent. There is no exercise
of will.
The named plaintiff is not the agent of the other class members,
and as a result class members will be bound by the result of the lawsuit
on the theory that their interests were represented by someone who
happened to appoint himself as a representative of those interests.
Obviously, such a method of appointment and the system of representation it sets into motion are inherently suspect and grate against even
a minimum regard for allowing individuals to be in charge of their
own destiny. The willingness of the legal system to tolerate interest
representation and the method of appointment it implies might stem
from two considerations.
One is the social importance of the class action. In some instances, most notably where great social harm is dispersed among
countless individuals, the class action is the only mechanism by which
our legal system can redress a large-scale public wrong. There, although permitting interest representation denies absent class members formal access to the courts, rejecting that form of representation
renders the legal system powerless to perform its most important function-holding accountable the party responsible for a great social
harm.
The second, and subsidiary, consideration is that in many situations in which interest representation is employed-paradigmatically,
where the dollar loss to each individual is small, though the aggregate
social harm is great-not much would be lost by the individual putatively represented if the representation proves inadequate. Each individual member of the class would lose the chance of litigating his
claim (a day in court), but because his individual stake is so small he
would probably never have utilized the opportunity. The loss would
be more formal than practical. Consent cannot be inferred from that
fact, but the lack of concrete harm is a relevant consideration in deciding whether to permit a representative lawsuit to go forward in the
absence of consent.
Rule 23 recognizes the value of the class action. It aims to permit
class actions in order to redress significant public wrongs, and for that
reason it accepts the concept of interest representation. At the same
time, the rule is mindful of the risks of abuse, and therefore it establishes requirements aimed to make certain that the named plaintiffthis self-appointed representative-adequately represents the interests
of the absent class members. Largely the product of a series of revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated in 1966,
Rule 23 has remained virtually the same for thirty-five years. In September 2002, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed
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amendments to the rule, which were passed on by the Judicial Conference to the Supreme Court in December 2002, and then by the Court
to Congress in March 2003, but in truth those amendments amount
only to small adjustments. 2 They leave the basic architecture of the
inherited rule. intact. From our perspective, however, the design of
the rule is flawed. We contend that the reform process set in motion
by the 2003 amendments should be continued and that the basic
structure of Rule 23 should be reconsidered.
Rule 23 is perfectly symmetrical: No distinction is made between
plaintiffs and defendants in class actions. In this way, the rule authorizes defendant class actions, although they are, as Jack Coffee put it,
about "as rare as unicorns."3 We believe, however, that the rule
should be amended to permit only plaintiff actions. This reform
would conform the rule to practice, but more fundamentally would
reflect the fact that the underlying theory of interest representation is
too tenuous to justify the consequences of the class format for members of the defendant class. Unlike plaintiff classes, in which the representative appoints himself, with defendant classes the adversarythe plaintiff-appoints the defendant class's representative. The
plaintiff has an obvious and powerful incentive to choose someone
who will poorly represent the class's interests. Moreover, the unnamed members of a defendant class risk not just the opportunity to
relitigate a claim-the downside of a plaintiff class action-but also
the imposition of a liability for being on the wrong end of a judicial
directive. Placing such a burden on an individual without his participation, or that of his agent, is grossly unfair. Joinder of all the defendants, even a large number, is always possible, and thus it is difficult to
think of some weighty social purpose that might tempt the law to risk
the unfairness presented by relying on interest representation in the
context of the defendant class action.
The plaintiff class action does, in contrast, serve a great social
purpose: The private enforcement of public laws. We believe it important, however, to revise Rule 23 to make certain that it is used only in
those situations where that social purpose is served. Even then, special provisions must be made to acknowledge the anomalous theory of
representation that is employed in the plaintiff class action and to prevent its abuse.
2

See

JUDICIAL

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, AGENDA F-18: REPORT OF THE
CONFERENCE

8-21

(2002)

[hereinafter

REPORT

OF

THE

JUDICIAL.

CONFERENCE].

3 John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 388 (2000).
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REQUIREMENTS FOR A Cl-ss ACTION

A court should not permit a plaintiff to bring suit on behalf of
unnamed class members unless the class lawsuit is necessary to vindicate important public rights and the named plaintiff satisfies the court
that he will adequately represent the interests of the other class members. To achieve this goal, Rule 23 presently requires a class action to
meet at least four, and sometimes six, requirements, and also to fit
into one of four descriptive categories. The 2003 amendments leave
this structure of Rule 23 untouched. We can well understand the decision to preserve the six requirements, and we also essentially leave
this feature of the rule in place. These requirements help insure that
a class action is being used only when necessary and that there is adequate interest representation. The descriptive categories, by contrast,
serve no relevant purpose that we can discern, and we would abolish
them.
A.

The Six Requirements

The first four requirements of the current rule-dubbed "numerosity," "commonality," "typicality," and "adequacy"-appear in section
23(a) and apply to all class actions. The fifth and sixth requirements-"predominance" and "superiority"-are listed in subsection
23(b) (3) and apply only to class actions that fall under that subsection, which defines the last of the four descriptive categories of section
23(b).
"Numerosity" means that "the class [must be] so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable." This requirement has value
if it is properly understood. The requirement's focus must be the size
of the class, not the practicality ofjoinder. Joinder is often impracticable for reasons other than the number of class members, the main
reasons being the small size of each claim and the fact that the group
is dispersed and disorganized. "Numerosity," however, reflects the
fact that only when there are many small individual claims is their
aggregation likely to constitute a social harm of sufficient magnitude
to warrant a class action and its anomalous form of representation.
The numerosity requirement thus helps limit class actions to circumstances in which they are necessary to uphold a value that is important
enough to justify the dangers to absent class members inherent in any
class action.
The same may be said of the requirement-applicable, under the
rule, only to certain types of class actions-that a class action be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy ("superiority"). Although the legal system accepts

1424

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:5

interest representation and the services of a self-appointed representative to create a private instrument for the enforcement of public laws,
it also must account for the conflict between such a form of representation and the ideal that each person has a right to his day in court.
Accordingly, class actions should be allowed only when there is no
good alternative. The current rule errs by confining this requirement
to class actions that fit within the descriptive category of subsection
23(b) (3), and we urge that it be made an explicit requirement of all
class actions.
As it now stands, subsection 23(b) (3) provides a non-exhaustive
checklist of factors for the judge to consider when she makes the superiority determination. This list points judges to several relevant considerations and should be retained. Its four factors are: (A) class
members' interests in bringing individual suits; (B) other litigation
already announced by class members; (C) the desirability of concentrating the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing the class action. By considering these and other
factors, a judge will, as she should, make a judgment about the need
to use the class format.
The other four requirements-commonality, typicality, predominance, and adequacy-are aimed not at policing the importance of
bringing the lawsuit as a class action, but instead at insuring that the
named plaintiff can be trusted to represent the interests of his fellow
class members. This determination is essential because the named
plaintiff has appointed himself the representative of the class, and has
no special justification for that self-election other than that he has an
interest in common with those who will be represented.
Typicality makes explicit the central idea underlying the theory of
interest representation: The named plaintiff is not permitted to represent the class unless his interest is essentially the same as those of
the unnamed members of the class. Or, in the words of the present
rule, the named plaintiff's claim must be typical of those of the class.
The commonality requirement serves the same purpose, though
it might also aid the judgment about the superiority of the class format. At present, it provides that there must be "questions of law or
fact common to the class." We propose making the commonality requirement stricter, first by changing "or" to "and," then by combining
it with what is now the "predominance" requirement found in subsection 23(b) (3). That is, we would insist that in every class action "the
questions of law and fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."
The commonality requirement's purpose is to insure proper interest
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representation, and such representation is impossible if either legal or
factual questions vary widely from one class member to another.
Even more than commonality and typicality, the adequacy requirement makes concerns about interest representation explicit. At
present it reads: "The representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." At the very least, this provision directs the court, which is charged with the responsibility of determining whether the class action should proceed, to search for conflicts
within the class that might exist even if the requirements of commonality and typicality are applied rigorously. For example, people with
identical interests might have radically different views as to how those
interests would best be furthered. 4 Such differences do not necessarily preclude interest representation, but if they are deep enough and
pervasive enough it might be inappropriate to allow the proceeding to
go forward on a class basis.
The adequacy requirement also enables the court to examine the
adequacy of the class's counsel. Although the named plaintiff is the
representative of the class, he is likely to be dwarfed by his attorney in
providing the representation of the class. 5 Because of technical expertise and specialization of function, lawyers often tend to lead or even
dominate their clients in any type of litigation; but this leadership role
is magnified considerably in the class action setting because the harm
is dispersed and each individual class member's claim is small.
Granted, the lawyer's gain is less than that of the class as a whole, but
it is likely to be significantly greater than that of the named plaintiff,
or any individual member of the class. Indeed, the entire idea of the
lawsuit is likely to emanate from the lawyer who, skating on the edge
of the prohibition against soliciting clients, locates the person who will
serve as the named plaintiff. On a formal level, the named plaintiff
appoints himself as the representative of the class. On a practical
level, he is appointed by the attorney who then represents him and
the class.
None of this lessens the social importance of the class action or
its public function. Lawyers gain, but the assumption is that private
gain is being harnessed for public purposes. It does mean, however,
that when a court inquires into the adequacy of representation, the
judge must decide not only whether the named plaintiffs interest is
4 See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183,
1186-91 (1982) (identifying a number of schisms that may develop among members
of a class).
5 See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIz. L. REV.
923, 927 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 Sup. CT. REV. 337, 354.

1426

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 78:5

more or less the same as that of the class and his views consonant with
those of the bulk of the class, but also whether the attorney is sufficiently capable and dedicated to the interests of the class.
The adequacy requirement of Rule 23 authorizes and requires
such inquiries. The 2003 amendments wisely make that explicit: They
separate the inquiries relating to the adequacy of the named plaintiff
(for example, commonality and typicality) from those relating to the
adequacy of the class counsel. Not only does the amended rule require the court to monitor class fees, but more importantly it requires
the court to treat the named plaintiffs choice of counsel as nothing
more than a proposal as to who shall constitute counsel for the class.
The new rule requires the court to assume responsibility for appointing that lawyer as counsel for the class, and it includes a non-*
exhaustive list of factors for a court to consider in evaluating the competence of the lawyer and his loyalty to the class. 6 The pre-amendment rule did not contain this checklist, but like the 2003
amendments presumed that the standards for judging the adequacy
of counsel would evolve on a case-by-case basis, as in the Sixth Amend7
ment context.
As with the other requirements (numerosity, superiority, commonality, typicality, and predominance), adequacy requires the judge
to make a judgment before she allows the case to proceed on a class
basis. However, if the judge initially finds the lawyer adequate, she
should have the power to reconsider this judgment once the case begins to unfold and she has a better sense of the lawyer's capacity and
loyalty. Given the centrality of the adequacy requirement to the idea
of the class action, the judge should have every opportunity to make
an informed decision.

6

The proposed Rule 23(g)(1)(C) reads,
(C) In appointing class counsel, the court
(i) must consider:
-the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action,
-counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action,
-counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, and
-the resources counsel will commit to representing the class;
(ii) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 276.
7 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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The Descriptive Categories of Section 23(b)

The current rule requires that every class action meet the socalled prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. In addition, it requires that the class fit into one of the four
descriptive categories or pigeonholes set forth in section 23(b).
(Those class actions falling into the fourth category, 23(b) (3), are subject also to the requirements of predominance and superiority.) Satisfying the prerequisites is thus merely necessary, not sufficient, to bring
a suit as a class action. The four categories, like the six requirements,
are left unchanged by the amendments proposed by the Advisory
Committee in September 2002, and sent to Congress by the Supreme
Court in March 2003.8

As explained above, we believe that in addition to numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy, the predominance and superiority requirements should apply to all class actions. However, we see
no reason that a class action satisfying the six requirements should be
compelled in addition to fit into one of the descriptive categories
listed in section 23(b). Unlike the six requirements, these four categories do not serve the purpose of directing a court to scrutinize either the adequacy of interest representation or the social value and
practical necessity of bringing a lawsuit as a class action. Indeed, we
find difficulty imagining any relevant purpose served by the categories, and we therefore urge their abolition.
1. Section 23(b) (1) (A): The Risk of Inconsistent Adjudications
The first descriptive category-section 23(b) (1) (A) -permits
class actions when separate individual actions might result in inconsistent adjudications. The assumption is that inconsistent adjudications
are an embarrassment for the law and can oppress a defendant by
imposing incompatible standards of conduct. All of this is true, but it
is not a reason to make the danger of inconsistent adjudications into a
separate class action requirement.
This point is best illustrated by two examples. First, imagine that
one taxpayer sues a municipality to prevent it from building a dam.
He loses, and then another taxpayer brings the same suit and wins.
There is a risk of this unfortunate result whenever a class action is
possible. Indeed, this risk must exist for a class action to satisfy the
typicality requirement. Whenever the claim of the named plaintiff is
typical of the claims of the members of the class, there would be a risk
of inconsistent adjudications if the class members' lawsuits were
8

REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,

supra note 2, at 8-21.
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brought separately. Thus the risk of inconsistency should not in itself
be a separate requirement, because in the context we are now considering this adds nothing to typicality.
In Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, ' the Supreme Court referred approvingly to a decision of the lower court requiring that the risk of
inconsistent adjudications be examined from a practical perspective:
Is it likely that the individual members of the class would bring separate suits?' If each class member's claim is small, then individual
suits are unlikely, and the practical risk of inconsistent adjudications is
therefore low. This reading of 23(b) (1) (A) makes the requirement
more specific than typicality, but the reading is deeply problematic
because in the most compelling instance for the use of the class action, namely, that of dispersed harm, the requirement will not be satisfied and thus (b) (1) (A) will never be available. The class actions that
the legal system most needs to permit are those in which the overall
harm is great but that suffered by each individual is small. A requirement that those actions by definition cannot satisfy would be a cruel
irony.
A second example arises when one taxpayer sues to prevent a municipality from building a dam while another sues to compel the municipality to build the dam. If these suits are allowed to proceed on an
individual basis, then there is a risk of inconsistent outcomes in still
another sense: Both plaintiffs might win. This example adheres more
strictly to the language of (b) (1) (A) than the initial example because
the individual lawsuits directly and explicitly establish incompatible
standards of behavior for the municipality: Should it build the dam?
But in such cases the risk of inconsistency cannot be a class action
requirement, for precisely the opposite reason that applied to the first
example. Where one group of taxpayers seeks one result, and another seeks the opposite, it is hard to imagine the typicality-the identity of interest-that is presumed by the concept of interest
representation. If the ranchers oppose the dam and the manufacturers support it, then it is unacceptable for one rancher to represent
both the ranchers and the manufacturers.
Without a class action, how can our legal system solve the problem of inconsistent adjudications that create incompatible standards
of conduct for the defendant? In the case of the ranchers and manufacturers, the separate lawsuits could be consolidated and adjudicated
together. Or, less satisfying, the cases could be brought separately and
the principle of stare decisis might prevent inconsistency. Or, the
9
10

417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Id. at 177-79.
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manufacturers could intervene in the ranchers' class action and appoint their own separate representative (perhaps aligning themselves
on the side of the defendant). This third option, like dividing the
class into two subclasses (ranchers and manufacturers), eliminates the
conflict of interest between the ranchers and manufacturers but at the
same time precludes justifying the class action on the basis of avoiding
the risk of inconsistent adjudications, for that risk must be assessed
from the perspective of the class (the ranchers) represented by the
named plaintiff (a rancher).
But even if these solutions were insufficient to solve the problem
of inconsistent adjudications that create incompatible standards of
conduct, that insufficiency would not justify broad use of the class action to solve the problem. The danger of incompatible standards
might be a genuine problem, but it cannot be conceived as ajustification for bringing suit as a class action-as Rule 23 currently casts itbecause it is actually a reason to discourage the use of a class action.
When there is a danger of incompatibility, there is less typicality and
worse interest representation. Far from being a requirement for class
actions, this type of case should make a court skeptical of a class
action.
2.

Section 23(b)(1)(B): The Limited Fund

The second descriptive category of section (b)- (b) (1) (B) -consists of cases in which an individual action "would as a practical matter
be dispositive of the interests" of other individuals. By way of example, the 1966 committee notes for Rule 23 identify the situation where
policyholders attack an association's proposed financial reorganization. A court cannot, the 1966 Advisory Committee reasoned, "confine the effects of a validation of the reorganization to the individual
plaintiffs," and thus the other members of the association would have
their rights "practically concluded" despite having had "no representation in the lawsuit."'' The Advisory Committee saw the class action as
the means of providing the necessary representation, but as with
(b) (1) (A) actions ignored the form of representation-interest representation-involved in the class action. Because the interests of all
the members of the association are by definition in competition with
one another, the named plaintiff is not likely to be an adequate representative of the interests of the members of the class. Devices need be
found to obtain representation of all the members of the association
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (B) advisory committee's note (1966) (citing Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Waybright v. Columbian Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Tenn. 1939)).
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in the reorganization, but the class action rests on too attenuated a
concept of representation to serve that purpose.
A similar point applies to the other example-when "claims are
made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all
claims"-offered by the 1966 Advisory Committee. 2 Although the
needs of all claimants to protect their interests is genuine, having the
named plaintiff appoint himself as the protector of those interests is
suspect because each claimant's interest is at odds with that of the
other claimants. The more money one claimant recovers, the less is
left for the others. Although the current rule makes the limited fund
situation a justification for a class action, the limited fund should be
viewed the opposite way-as something antithetical to the principle
on which class actions are based. Just as the rancher/manufacturer
case presents reasons to avoid a class action, not to use one, the same
can be said of limited fund cases. Sections (b) (1) (A) and (b) (1) (B)
of the current rule strangely characterize these types of cases as requirements for a class action on the theory that they constitute ajustification for a class action, but just the opposite is true.
Section (b) (1) (B) seems to contemplate a fixed fund, and, in
such cases, joinder will often be a viable alternative to a class action.
Imagine, however, a product that severely injures millions of people.
Here the harm is widespread but, unlike the prototypical class action,
not dispersed in small amounts. Each person suffers great harm. The
victims could bring the suit individually because the prospect of recovery is great enough to make the suit economically viable. A number
of victims could join together as plaintiffs to increase the fund available for the attorney fees and thus increase the quality of representation-still no class action. The litigation portrayed in A Civil Action
involved twenty-one plaintiffs, enlarging the war chest available to Jan
Schlichtmann, but it was not a class action.' 3 Imagine, however, that
in the style of recent asbestos or tobacco litigation a few victims and
their attorney created a class of all persons injured by the product.
That would vastly increase the potential award against the defendant
manufacturer. The greater recovery would enlarge the resources
available for securing the most able lawyers and funding the preparation of their case (for example, expert witnesses and extensive
discovery).
Lawyers have tried to bring this type of suit within 23 (b) (1) (B)
on the theory that the total exposure of the defendant firm greatly
12
13

Id.
SeeJONATHAN HARR,

stone Pictures 1999).

A CIVIL ACION (1995); see also A CIVIL

ACTION (Touch-
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exceeds its assets.' 4 This means that if each person in the class individually prosecuted his suit, and these cases were tried seriatim, a risk
would be created that some victims would be left without an economically viable enterprise from which to recover. A de facto limited fund
might be said to exist. To a degree, we have the same concern as we
did with the true limited fund case-the interests of the members of
the class are in competition.' 5 There is, however, an additional factor:
A class action benefits all members of the class by increasing the resources available for successfully litigating the action.
This benefit might be sufficient to justify the maintenance of the
suit under the superiority requirement, but no hint of it can be found
in (b) (1) (B). Indeed, (b) (1) (B) points in the wrong direction. That
section identifies the class members' competing interests in the limited fund as a basis for bringing the lawsuit as a class action, when in
fact that competition between class members gives the court a reason
to deny class certification. In the final analysis, the court must weigh
the class members' competing interests against the class members'
common interest in increasing their litigation resources through aggregation of their claims (because that increase in resources improves
their chances of success in the lawsuit).
3.

Section 23(b) (2): Injunctive Proceedings

The third category of class action is established by section
23(b) (2). It has two requirements. First, it requires that the defendant have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class. This
requirement is certainly sensible-it goes to the heart of interest representation-but it is fully subsumed under the commonality and typicality requirements. How can the named plaintiff have a claim that is
typical of the members of the class unless the defendant acted on
grounds generally applicable to the class?
The second requirement does not appear as a requirement but
was made one by judicial construction. After stating that the defendant must act on grounds generally applicable to the class, the rule
continues: "thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." In
14

See, e.g., In. re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.

1992).
15 See generally Mark W. Friedman, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation:
Requiring Class Members To Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a FederalClass
Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745, 753-55 (1990); see also id. at 753 (noting the "widely ac-

cepted fact that any one person's monetary recovery (where available) is often greater
in individual than in group actions"); id. at 755 (referring to "the litigation dynamic
that individual suits yield higher per-person damage awards than class actions").
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the context of explaining why a certain class action had to be brought
under (b) (3) as opposed to (b) (2), the Supreme Court in Eisen construed (b) (2) to be applicable only when the relief sought was exclusively or predominantly injunctive or declaratory.' 6
Even with this narrowing construction there is an obvious overlap
problem. Injunctive actions can also fit under (b) (1) (remember the
example of the dam) and (b) (3). The rule provides no guidance in
these situations where multiple categorizations are possible. Eisen
might be read as providing guidance in such situations, for it construed the requirements of (b)(2) and (b)(1) in such a way as to require that most class actions be brought under (b) (3).17 That
resolution seems similar in a way to the reform urged here, as both in
effect make (b) (3) the only type of class action. Yet our reasons and
method differ. The Supreme Court prioritized (b) (3) in order to insist upon stringent notice requirements, and it achieved this result by
reinterpreting (b) (1) and (b) (2) in such a way as to make them virtually unavailable in the paradigmatic situation of dispersed harm.' 8 As
we will develop later, our reform broadens notice, but that is a consequence of, not the reason for, the change, which stems from an appreciation of the limits of interest representation; and we proceed not
through a narrowing construction of the (b) (1) and (b) (2) categories, but through a direct consideration of their underlying theory.
In addition to the overlap problem, it is hard to understand why
the remedy alone-injunctions as opposed to damages-should become a basis for authorizing class actions independent of any assessment as to whether the class action is superior to other means
available for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. As
an illustration, imagine an employment discrimination lawsuit against
a firm with hundreds of thousands of employees, scattered throughout the nation. The named plaintiff, trying to correct for past discrimination, asks for a remedy that puts the class members in the position
they would have been in if there had been no discrimination. If the
remedy were an injunction, requiring, for example, the firm to give
the victims of discrimination additional promotional rights, then
under the current rule the suit could be brought under (b) (2) and
the superiority requirement (which now applies only to (b) (3) class
actions) would be avoided. If, on the other hand, the suit sought
monetary compensation-not just back pay, but actual compensation-(b) (2) would become unavailable, and in all likelihood the ac16
17
18

Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 163 n.4 (1974); id. at 177 n.14.
Id. at 173.
Id.
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tion would be treated as a (b) (3) action. As a consequence, the court
would have to reflect on the manageability of the class action, the appropriateness of individual control over the prosecution of the action,
and the wisdom of concentrating the litigation in a single forum.
Whether or not the court would allow the action to proceed on a class
basis, we see no basis for the differentiation between the two cases:
The judicial inquiry should not vary depending on the remedy sought.
The Advisory Committee responsible for the 1966 amendments
explained that (b) (2) was inspired by the civil rights litigation then
taking shape.1' - We fully embrace the civil rights cases but find no
reason within them that would make an injunction more deserving of
class action treatment than a lawsuit seeking damages. Indeed, the
most compelling case for a class action comes in the damages context-dispersed harm. In fact, when the named plaintiff seeks an injunction, as in the typical school desegregation case, it is not even
clear what is to be gained for him or the class by casting the suit in
terms of a class action. If the named plaintiff brings suit individually
and wins, then the defendant will be bound to act in a way that confers benefits on the entire class-to desegregate the schools-and that
obligation can easily be enforced by all the members of the class.
They can either intervene or bring a new suit and hold the defendant,
who had participated in the prior proceeding, to that initial judgment. But if the named plaintiff brings a class action and loses, the
members of the class will be bound by that defeat. This would make
the class form advantageous to the defendant, but neither we nor
Rule 23 contemplates giving defendants the power to compel plaintiffs to bring a suit in class form. It is one thing to tolerate a selfappointed representative, but another to allow for compulsory service
as a representative.
Some might defend the use of the class action in the injunctive
context as a device to mitigate the dangers of mootness, occasioned,
for example, by the graduation of the named plaintiffs in a school
desegregation case. But the class action is not the only method of
overcoming this problem. If the suit were brought on an individual
basis, the lawyer for the named plaintiff would find a substitute or
bring the individual action on behalf of a number of individuals.
Thus, rather than finding a reason to exclude injunctive actions from
the superiority requirement (as the current rule does), we are at a loss

19 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note (1966) ('Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating un...).
lawfully against a class.
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to explain why plaintiffs seeking injunctions would even want to utilize
the class action form.
4.

Section 23(b) (3): The Catchall

The fourth descriptive category, section 23(b) (3), is less a category than a catchall for those class actions that do not fit into one of
the first three pigeonholes. Under the current rule, any such action
must satisfy the requirements of predominance and superiority. Because of these requirements and the additional obstacles placed on
23(b) (3) class actions, above all the costs of notice, plaintiffs struggle
to stay out of that category and defendants anxious to defeat the class
format push in the opposite direction. As a result, the certification
hearings often turn into a classification game. Our proposal would
end that game. We would apply the predominance and superiority
requirements across the board and would subject each class action to
the full set of six requirements that now applies only to (b) (3) actions.
In that sense, we want every class action to be treated as a (b) (3)
action.
II.

THE SPECIAl. PROTECTIVE DEVICES:

NOTICE, INTERVENTION, AND OPT-OUT

The six requirements currently found in sections 23(a) and
23(b) (3) help to protect absent class members against the threat of
inadequate representation of their interests by the named plaintiff.
But as the rule recognizes, those requirements are not enough; the
absent class members must in addition receive an opportunity to protect themselves. Rule 23 imposes on the class actions that it permits
three protective devices-notice, intervention, and opt-out rightsthat enable unnamed class members to guard against the dangers present in interest representation. Section (b), which we have said we
would abolish, plays an important role in the current scheme by assigning different protective measures to class actions falling within
subsection (b) (3) than to those falling within subsections (b) (1) and
(b) (2). Indeed, it might well be that the linkage between the section
(b) categories and the notice, intervention, and opt-out provisions accounts for the persistence of section (b) and its categories, which, as
just explained, lack any intrinsic logic.
A.

Notice

Notifying absent class members of the lawsuit is meant to solve
some of the problems caused by the anomalous character of represen-
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tation in a class action. Within that framework, however, a distinction
needs to be drawn between two different purposes of notice. One is
to check on the adequacy of representation being provided to the
class, and the other is to render viable the right of unnamed class
members to take certain protective measures, specifically to intervene
or to opt out of the lawsuit.
When a judge rules that a lawsuit fulfills the six requirements, she
renders what is best described as a preliminary or conditional decision
to certify the class-to permit the lawsuit to go forward on a class basis.20 This initial decision is made without the benefit of input from
unnamed class members, who are unaware that they are being represented. Because such input often provides crucial aid in assessing the
adequacy of interest representation-the best judge of a person's interests is usually the person himself-the court must, in our view, then
require that notice be sent to absent class members. Notice would
give them some opportunity to complain about the adequacy of representation likely to be provided by the individual who appointed himself to represent their interests. Upon hearing objections from class
members, the judge may then affirm her original decision to certify
the class; or alternatively, she may rule that the six requirements have
not, after all, been satisfied and may therefore revoke the preliminary
certification.
The current rule gives the judge complete discretion to decide
what, if any, notice the named plaintiff must provide to absent class
members in actions that fall under the categories of (b) (1) (A),
(b) (1) (B), and (b) (2). By contrast, it requires the named plaintiff in
any (b) (3) class action to furnish "the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all [class] members
who can be identified through reasonable effort." The 2003 amendments leave this structure unchanged (other than to insist that the
language of the notice be "plain" and "easily understood"),21 but we
20 The pre-amendment rule permitted the judge to certify the class "conditional [ly]," i.e., pending further developments that might affect her decision. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(1). The 2003 amendments delete this provision, directing "[a] court
that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met" to "refuse certification until they have been met." REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2,
at 249 (proposing FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1)(C) advisory committee's note). The court
"may designate interim counsel before determining whether to certify the action as a
class action." Id. at 277 (proposing FED. R. Civ. P. 2 3(g) (2) (A)). Both the pre-amendinent rule and the 2003 amendments authorize the judge to revisit her initial decision: "An order [to certify] may be altered or amended before" final judgment. Id. at
243 (proposing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(I)).
21 See REPORT OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 243 (proposing FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B)).
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think it is flawed. The rule should not permit, in some cases, a judge
to dispense entirely with notice. Nor should it require, in an entire
category of cases, judges to insist upon individual notice. The factors
that are relevant in determining what kind of notice is required for
the class have little to do with the descriptive categories of 23(b).
In every class action, notice will be valuable as an instrument for
checking the adequacy of interest representation. Rule 23 should
take account of this fact by requiring notice in all class lawsuits. But
because the appropriate form and extent of notice vary from one case
to the next, the rule should grant judges the flexibility to tailor notice
to the needs of the particular case. The Supreme Court recognized
the principles underlying these views in its decision in Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank,2 2 a case in which it held that some beneficiaries in a
common trust could be bound by a court judgment settling their accounts, even if they had not participated in the proceeding that resulted in the judgment and had no knowledge of the proceeding.
What mattered was that their interests were adequately represented. 23
To insure such adequacy, it was necessary that some, though not all,
members of the class of beneficiaries be given actual notice-which
the Supreme Court judged was more likely to be effectuated by individual letters than by publication in a newspaper. Those who received
notice would have an opportunity to scrutinize the adequacy of representation being provided for the class of beneficiaries in general. The
touchstone of due process was adequate representation. Notice was
thus required in Mullane as a matter of due process, but only in a
derivative sense and only for instrumental purposes-namely, to serve
as a means of checking the adequacy of the representation being
afforded.
One might think that if notice has only instrumental value, then
like any instrument it sometimes can be dispensed with. Indeed, in
his opinion for the Court in Eisen, Justice Powell made a comment to
this effect. 24 Yet this proposition possesses only an analytic truth and
disregards the practicality of class actions. Given the dangers of interest representation and self-election of a representative, any proceeding to examine the adequacy of representation would greatly benefit if
some members of the class were notified that they were being represented and were allowed to voice their opinions as to the adequacy of
22 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
23 Id. at 316-17.
24 Eisen v. Carlisle &,Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974) ("[P]etitioner's argument proves too much, for it quickly leads to the conclusion that no notice at all,
published or otherwise, would be required in the present case.").
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that representation. So much so that it would be hard to think of
situations when there would be no notice at all to any members of the
class. Because this would be true of all class actions, it makes no sense
to distinguish among the types or categories of classification-(b) (1),
(b) (2), or (b) (3)-for purposes of determining whether notice to absent class members is mandatory.
The notice we would require to absent class members is actual
notice. To give class members an opportunity to assess the quality of
representation being provided, they must actually be informed of the
lawsuit and the claimed representation. A letter mailed to them that
goes astray might be a valiant effort, but it does not provide the addressee with the opportunity that due process mandates. A question
can be raised, however, whether the notice is selective or universal:
Must every single member of the class receive notice? As presently
structured, Rule 23 approaches the universal ideal only with (b) (3)
class actions. For (b) (3) actions, subsection (c) (2) requires "individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort." We say that this requirement-referred to as individual, as
opposed to collective, notice-merely approachesuniversalism because
it does not protect those members of the class who cannot be identified through reasonable effort. Nor does it protect those who do not
receive actual notice, because it has been understood to require the
sending, but not the receipt, of individual letters.
Although the notice requirement for (b) (3) actions is prefaced
by the Mullane formula, specifically requiring "the best notice practicable under the circumstances," the rule in fact departs from the principle of that case by appending to it the particular result reached in
Mullane. The rule does not permit the judge to fashion the kind of
notice required by considering crucial practical factors such as the
cost of the notice, what consequences expensive notice might have for
the members of the class action, the homogeneity of the interest
among class members, and the size of the claims. We propose a return to the Mullane principle unqualified, and we would apply it to all
class actions. The rule should require, in every class action, the best
notice practicable under the circumstances. Oddly, the Eisen Court
thought it was bound by the ill-advised wording of (c) (2) and thus was
unable to pursue the Mullane principle and approve the collective notice at issue in that case (random notice).
Even more oddly, the 2002 Advisory Committee, fully aware of
the Court created for itself, failed to propose amenddilemma
the
ments that would have changed the language of (c) (2) so as to make
it more nearly in accord with the principle of Mullane, which, as we
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said, would require notice to the class in all class actions, but only the
best notice practicable under the circumstances.
In addition to requiring the best notice practicable under the circumstances, Rule 23 would be further improved if it specified-in
much the style of the superiority checklist 25-the factors a court
should consider in making thatjudgment. One such factor is the cost
of providing notice to the entire class. Costs vary depending on the
size of the class and the means available for reaching the entire class.
New advances in computer technology have created new ways of cutting the costs of notice to vast numbers of people. The court should
always pursue the least costly notice.
The second factor is the importance of reaching every member of
the class. Here both the magnitude of the interest of each member of
the class and variations in their interests are relevant. In Eisen, which
involved price-fixing by stockbrokers in odd-lot transactions, the interests among the members of the class were relatively homogeneous and
small. The named plaintiffs claim was valued at seventy dollars, so
responses to the notice or protests about inadequate representation
were very unlikely.2" In such a case, extensive notice is relatively unimportant. By contrast, in an asbestos class action, the claims of individual members of the class might be vast (each might seek millions),
and there would be differences among individuals in the etiology of
the illness, the causal chain, and even the type of asbestos-related injury. 27 There, extensive notice would be of great importance.
The third factor involves the consequence of the notice requirement on the maintainability of the class action, and the importance of
the class format. In analyzing this factor we operate on the assumption-though we do not necessarily endorse it-that the responsibility
for paying the costs of notice requirements shall be on the shoulders
of the plaintiff as opposed to the defendant or the court system. Although the Supreme Court has expressed the view that in some instances courts may justifiably require a defendant to share notice costs
with the plaintiff,2 S this practice rarely occurs. Accordingly, some con-

sideration should be given to the capacity of the plaintiff to raise the
funds necessary to defray the costs of notice. If the necessary funds
cannot be raised, then the judge must further consider whether the
25 See FID. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
26 Eisen, 417 U.S. at 161.
27 See Ainchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-25 (1997).
28 Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350 (1978) ("[W]e think that
where a defendant can perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice, such as
identification, more efficiently than the representative plaintiff, the district court has
discretion to order him to perform the task under Rule 23(d).").
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underlying claims might be prosecuted on an individual basis. In the
imagined asbestos case, the answer might be yes; whereas in cases of
dispersed harm like Eisen, the answer would be no. Where expensive
notice would cripple a class action that could not be brought as separate individual suits, a judge should try to avoid imposing such a notice requirement. A less expensive alternative will virtually always be a
better way to balance public justice with the demands of interest representation in such cases.
B.

Intervention

Upon receiving notice or otherwise learning of the class action, a
class member may contest the representation provided by the named
plaintiff. If the judge decides there is merit to the contesting party's
claim, she will revoke her conditional certification of the class or possibly allow the disgruntled class member to serve as the representative
of the class. If, on the other hand, the judge decides that there is no
merit to the claim and determines that the other requirements for a
class action are satisfied, then the judge will allow the suit to proceed
as a class action. At that point, the disgruntled class member might
seek to intervene for purposes of representing his own interest. Despite the social value of interest representation and of allowing the
named plaintiff to appoint himself the representative of the class,
courts will justifiably be prone to give an individual class member the
opportunity to represent himself if that individual is unhappy with the
quality of his representation in the class action. This too, like many of
the proposed reforms, acknowledges the anomalous quality of interest
representation.
The Federal Rules treat intervention fully in Rule 24, separating it
from the class action rule. We are of the mind, however, that Rule 23
should include its own section on intervention because Rule 24 is not
fully responsive to the needs of class actions. Section (a) of Rule 24,
the provision that authorizes intervention as a matter of right, requires the would-be intervener to demonstrate that his interest is not
being adequately represented. Unless we draw a distinction between
the meaning of adequate representation in Rule 23 and its meaning
in Rule 24, the prospective intervener would encounter a barrier to
intervention in the class action setting. Intervention would be sought
after the class had been certified and the judge had made the determination that the named plaintiff was adequately representing the class.
That judgment should always be open to reconsideration, but we imagine that intervention by a disgruntled class member may be appropriate even when the named plaintiff is an adequate representative of
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the class (of which the would-be intervener is a member). The concept of interest representation may be sufficient to sustain the class
action, but it should not prevent someone who is unhappy with the
person claiming to be his representative from speaking for himself.
Relying on Rule 24(a), as Rule 23 now does, might obscure this point.
Admittedly, section (b) of Rule 24, referred to as "permissive intervention," does not require the would-be intervener to demonstrate inadequate representation, but it is not a solution to the problem. Rather
than recognizing a right of intervention, it gives the judge unfettered
discretion to grant or deny the request to intervene.
Intervention is fleetingly mentioned in Rule 23, but the rule
should address it more fully. Rule 23(c) (2) (C) dictates that the notice sent to class members shall advise them that "any member [of the
class] who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires,
enter an appearance through counsel." We endorse the idea of a special intervention provision for class actions. We also believe that it
should be sufficiently generous to account for the anomalous character of interest representation, and therefore it should be a right. Subsection 23(c) (2) (C) is a step in the right direction, but only a step.
Two changes are needed.
First, intervention should not appear as an appendage to notice,
but should be recognized more directly. Currently, the intervention
right is created indirectly by reference to what a notice letter must
include; subsection (c) (2) states that notice must inform class members that they have a right to intervene. We propose that the rule
declare that "class members have a right to intervene." Second, intervention rights should apply to all class actions, not merely those that
fall into the current (b) (3) category. Any class action involves the possibility that certain class members will be dissatisfied with the class representative and will want to represent themselves. This dissatisfaction
is no less likely to occur-and no less important when it does occurin class actions that seek injunctions instead of damages, or in limited
fund cases, or in cases that involve a risk of inconsistent adjudications.
Although we recognize a right of intervention for the individual
class member, and do so out of recognition of a person's right to
speak for himself, we do not believe that a system of notice need be
created to apprise fully each and every member of the class of this
right. Such a second round of notice, which would have to be individualized because the right it seeks to protect is highly individualized,
would unduly encumber the class format. The right to intervene is
important, but not important enough to defeat the social purposes
served by this procedural device.
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We also acknowledge that exceptional circumstances mightjustify
denying the application to intervene of some of those individual class
members who happen to learn of the suit. Intervention is not of the
discretionary character of Rule 24(b), but neither is it an absolute entitlement: It is a right, but only a qualified one. Sometimes there
might be hundreds of separate intervention requests, many of which
could clearly be rejected without diminishing the adequacy of interest
representation of the class. Of course, the individual interest of those
wanting to speak for themselves is still present, but honoring that interest by granting every request to intervene might cause the litigation
to become unmanageable and spin out of control. A narrow manageability exception should be recognized in such cases, but doing so
should not detract from the general point: Given the inherent limits
of the form of representation involved in a class action, a request for
intervention by an absent class member typically should be honored
by the court.
C. Opt-Out
The option of intervening existed prior to 1966. In the 1966 revisions to Rule 23, another option was created: The opt-out (which, like
the rule's provisions about intervention, is left untouched by the 2003
amendments). An absent class member who is dissatisfied with the
named plaintiffs representation may exclude himself from the class
and preserve his right to litigate his claim separately. Opt-out is a
right that can be exercised either in anticipation of or after class certification, and like intervention it is highly individualistic and stems
from a recognition of the intrinsic limits of interest representation. It
differs from intervention, however, in one important respect. When
an absent class member intervenes, he not only protects his own interests but, by participating in the case and making his views known, he
also protects the interests of similarly situated absent class members
who do not intervene. The individual who opts out might be signaling his unhappiness with the suit, but he is essentially protecting
himself.
The opt-out, like recognition of intervention in Rule 23, is confined to (b) (3) class actions. This linkage is more an accident of history than a rationally defensible design. Between 1938 (when the
Federal Rules first came into effect) and 1966, the practice of categorizing class actions emerged.2 9 The structure of section (b) reflects
29

See generally DEBORAH

R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS

9-37 (2000);

Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 391-93 (1967).
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that practice: Section (b) (1) attempts to define what were then referred to as true or hybrid class actions, and section (b) (3) can be
understood as giving preclusive effect to what were then referred to as
spurious class actions-class actions that provided great benefit to
class members if the plaintiff won, but that did not preclude the absent class members from further litigation if the defendant won. Section (b) (3) sought to render the spurious class real by binding absent
class members when the defendant won, and in order to accomplish
this it was thought necessary to make such class actions the object of
special protective devices such as opt-out. Yet the justification for the
opt-out right could apply to any class action. It is premised on the
idea that a class member can better represent his own interests in a
separate lawsuit, or by not suing at all, and the legitimacy of that wish
does not turn on the type of class action involved.
Linked to the (b) (3) category of class actions, the opt-out right
was sometimes seen as a justification for individual notice of a universal character: The right was individualized, so the notice had to be
individualized as well. We believe, however, that opt-out should be
kept distinct from notice, which, as we explained, should be tailored
to help insure the adequacy of representation. Admittedly, only those
who receive notice will have the information necessary to exercise
their right to opt out (notice informs people that there is a lawsuit to
opt out of), but this fact should not count as a reason for extending or
universalizing notice. The extensiveness of notice should be determined independently of opt-out, which then should be perceived as a
protective device available to the disgruntled class member. Opt-out
rights tend to be important when individual stakes are high and interests begin to diverge, and that is precisely the situation that requires
the most extensive notice-not to serve the opt-out right, but rather
to test for the adequacy of representation.
As in the case of intervention, some might perceive a tension between, on the one hand, our insistence on acknowledging the opt-out
right, and on the other, our refusal to require notice that is sufficiently extensive to give effect to that right for every class member.
However, we view that tension as a natural outgrowth of the accommodation of values inherent in the class action. We permit interest representation to make economically viable private enforcement of
public laws in the situation of dispersed harm, but we place limits on
how far this form of representation may be stretched. In striking such
an accommodation of values, it is essential to check the adequacy of
interest representation, and that check is the main purpose of notice.
Honoring a person's request to opt out of an action in which his interests are being represented adequately is far less important, and courts
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typically should be unwilling to impose, for that purpose, the expensive notice requirements that so often cripple class actions seeking redress for dispersed harm.
In some cases opt-out can be abused, and the right to opt out can
be denied. For example, when a class seeks an injunction, a class
member whose interests are identical to those of the named plaintiffs
might opt out solely for the purpose of preserving his chance for "a
second bite at the apple." That is, if the plaintiff class prevails and the
injunction is granted, then the person who opts out shares in the benefit. If the class loses, then the person who opts out has preserved his
right to bring a suit seeking the identical injunction that the class unsuccessfully sought-perhaps before a more sympathetic judge. He
would have to overcome stare decisis, but the first decision would not
be resjudicata. In such a situation, ajudge in the initial action should
deny the class member's opt-out request.
III.

SETTLEMENT

All litigation is prone to settlement, and class actions are no exception to this rule. Sometimes the agreement between the named
plaintiff and the defendant is reached even before the class is certified. The prospect of settlement does not lessen the need for a court
to make certain that all the requirements for certifying class actions
are satisfied, including the sending of notice to absent class members.
In fact, we believe that the prospect of settlement increases the court's
responsibility to make certain that the class meets the conditions for
certification.
In any class action, the named plaintiff decides to bring a suit on
a class basis and appoints himself as the class's representative. As a
consequence, the named plaintiff will always argue in favor of class
certification: He will argue that the requirements for bringing a suit as
a class action have been met and will try to keep notice to the class at a
minimum. Who is arguing against class certification? In some cases
the defendant is-for example, when he knows that the claim can be
prosecuted only on a class basis and there is little danger of individual
suits. In such a case, the defendant, oddly enough, acts as a surrogate
representative of the absent class members, disputing the named
plaintiff's claim that he is an adequate representative of the class.
Even here, however, no one can fully trust the defendant's representation of the interests of the absent class members. The defendant
hopes to be confronted by a wholly inadequate representative of the
class, and he will not challenge the claim of representation or demand
the kind of notice that will provoke such a challenge when it is most
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needed. The defendant may also endorse the class format when, due
to the magnitude of individual losses, individual lawsuits by class members are a real threat, and the defendant sees the class action as a way
of foreclosing those suits altogether.
Every certification proceeding, therefore, presents a risk that the
interests of the absent class members, even as to the certification issues, will not be fully pressed. The judge must seek to minimize that
risk, and in the certification proceedings she must assume an independent responsibility for testing the adequacy of representation provided. The need for such judicial oversight is compounded when, as
is sometimes the case, the named plaintiff and the defendant reach a
settlement of the underlying substantive claim before the case is certified. Such an agreement creates an adversarial void, and the responsibility is placed wholly on the shoulders of the court to make certain
that the requirements of class actions are satisfied. An adversarial void
does not make the class action requirements any less important; it simply makes it difficult for the judge to apply them.
Section 23(e) dictates that no class action may end in settlement
unless the court approves the settlement. The court's obligation to
scrutinize the settlement of the underlying substantive claim does not,
however, supplant its obligation to certify the class action and thus to
determine whether the requirements for maintaining a class action
are satisfied. Of course, the judge may peek at the terms of the agreement to help her determine, for example, whether the named plaintiff is providing or will provide adequate representation to the class.
Yet neither the agreement's existence nor its terms reduce the need
for the judge to make certain that the requirements for class actions
are satisfied, including the requirement that the class members be adequately represented. Not every fair agreement is the best agreement
that the absent class members could legitimately expect.
To some extent, this view accords with the Supreme Court's position in the recent Amchem1 1 and Ortiz l cases. These cases arose from
asbestos litigation and involved "settlement classes"-classes seeking
to be certified for settlement even though they could not be certified
for trial. At issue was the question whether the requirements of a class
action might be adjusted downward when the parties reach agreement
before certification. With respect to the adequacy requirement, the
Court answered emphatically in the negative and underscored the
special need to scrutinize the adequacy of representation.3 2 It made
30
31
32

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Id. at 832-37; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613-19.
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that ruling in a case in which the defendant had a great interest in
precluding individual lawsuits and thus favoring the class format, but
it was not confined to such a context. For the reasons just given, we
endorse that view, although we disagree with another aspect of the
Court's ruling.
Amchem was a (b) (3) class action. That section requires a court to
find that a "class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." It also directs a
court, in making this judgment, to consider (among other factors)
"the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the
action." The particular class action before the Court in Amchem posed
enormous problems of manageability if the case were tried. The class
was vast, consisting of victims of asbestos-related diseases, some of
whom had not yet manifested symptoms. At the very minimum the
trial of this suit would have required the application and thus coordination of the tort laws of all the states. To isolate the precise issue
raised by settlement classes, we need to assume that these problems
would have led a court not to certify the class action if it were to be
tried. The named plaintiffs and the defendant, however, insisted that
this and perhaps other manageability problems would disappear if the
case were settled. The Supreme Court agreed with them and held
that the manageability criterion should be applied on the assumption
that the action would be settled, not tried, since that is what the parties contemplated. 33 The named plaintiffs thus were not required to
show that the class was manageable for trial.
We appreciate the distinction the Court drew between the manageability factor and the adequacy of representation requirement.
Adequacy of representation seeks to protect the absent class members,
while manageability primarily protects the interests of the judiciary.
Nevertheless, disregarding the manageability factor on the assumption that the case will never be tried runs counter to a basic principle
of our legal system. Courts sit to try cases, and their power to settle
cases is only ancillary or incidental to that activity. If a case is so unmanageable that it cannot be tried, then the court's power to approve
or police a settlement ceases. Put another way, if the case cannot go
to trial, then court approval of a settlement falls outside the bounds of
the judiciary's power to resolve cases and controversies; a case that
cannot go to trial is not a case.
The 2003 amendments do not touch the issue of settlement classes at all; after all, the recommendations of the Advisory Committee
had, in the end, to be passed on by the Supreme Court and the Com33

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-22.
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mittee might have thought it foolhardy to attempt a revision of
Amchem along the lines we have indicated. Admittedly, our proposal
might be seen as a criticism of the Supreme Court's position, but because that position was partly (though, we think, wrongly) defended
as an act of deference to the rules as written, we imagine a more robust Advisory Committee might take up the issue and reverse Amchem
on the manageability issue. Although we have proposed that the classification scheme of section (b) be abolished altogether, we retain the
predominance and superiority requirements of (b) (3) and apply
them to all class actions. Accordingly, we propose that Rule 23 require courts to consider manageability in determining whether the
class action is a superior mechanism for the fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy, and that they make that judgment on the only
assumption that vests them with power-that they will be called upon
to adjudicate the matter.
Once certified, the class action can then proceed to discovery,
pretrial, and trial. Even then, somewhere along the way the parties
might agree to settle the substantive claim, and if so, a further question arises: Who will be bound by the settlement? When a class action
is fully litigated and judgment is rendered, all class members are
bound by the decision. None of the class members can go back to
court to relitigate the issue-even those who received no notice of the
lawsuit. We accept this preclusion as a consequence of interest representation. We see, however, a central difference between adjudication
and settlement, and we therefore propose to limit a settlement's binding effect to those members of the class who affirmatively agree to the
settlement-that is, those who opt in. This proposal, if accepted, will
deprive the debate over settlement classes of much of its practical importance, since the incentive to settle class actions will be greatly reduced. We appreciate the practical consequences of a rule
disfavoring settlement, yet we are driven to it by elemental principles
of justice and a clear appreciation of the nature of interest
representation.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutls,3 4 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of an opt-in, but in a different context. Shutts involved a
class action in a state court in Kansas. The plaintiff class consisted of
approximately 30,000 persons, scattered throughout the United
States, whose individual claims were worth an average of about $100.
The defendant argued that the Kansas court lacked personal jurisdiction over the unnamed members of the class unless those members
opted in. To advance this theory, the defendant drew an analogy be34 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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tween unnamed members of a plaintiff class and out-of-state defendants who have no minimum contacts with the forum in which a case is
litigated. The Supreme Court rejected this analogy, explaining that
the purpose of requiring minimum contacts is "to protect a defendant
from the travail of defending in a distant forum,' '13 5 a purpose inapplicable to plaintiffs because the "burdens placed by a State upon an
absent class-action plaintiff are not of the same order or magnitude as
those it places upon an absent defendant."36 The Court, of course,
acknowledged the downside risk that unnamed members of the class
experience in any class action (an unfavorable judgment against the
plaintiff), but it rejected the need for an opt-in to justify exposing
them to that risk. Individual notice, the right to opt out, and an inquiry about the adequacy of representation were sufficient, the Court
concluded, to allow the judgment of the Kansas Court to bind the
absent class members to an unfavorable judgment. 37 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court in effect held that for unnamed members of the
class there is no independent personal jurisdictional requirement
over and above the due process requirements for maintaining a class
action in the first place. The Shutts Court spoke to the bare requirements for maintaining a class action at all, not to the distinction between settlement and adjudication or to the special requirementssuch as opt-in-that might be imposed in the context of settlement.
Our opt-in proposal stems from an emphasis upon the public
character of adjudication as opposed to settlement. Adjudication requires a public officer-the judge-to listen to the formal presentations of facts and law, to decide who has the better of the arguments,
and then to justify her decision in terms of publicly acknowledged
principles. A judgment entered on the basis of this process is endowed with the authority of the law and is binding upon the parties.
Sometimes the litigants abort this process and enter into an arrangement-a settlement-with each other that makes both parties happier
than they would have been if the case were fully litigated. This arrangement is simply a contract between the parties. The authority of
this contract, like that of any contract, is based on the parties' consent.
In some instances, the settlement may be effectuated by ajudgment of
the court, but such a judgment's authority derives from the consensual arrangement from which the judgment arises. We refer to this
form of settlement as a consent judgment or consent decree.
35

Id. at 807.

36

Id. at 808. Such burdens include bearing the costs of discovery and potentially

paying damages to the plaintiff. Id.
37

Id. at 809.
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In a class action, the named plaintiff acts as a representative of
the unnamed members of the class, but there is no consensual tie
between the two. Class actions entail interest, not agency, representation, and though interest representation might have its place in the
world, we would never endow it with the power to form contracts. A
self-appointed representative, even one who fully represents my interests, can never enter legally binding contracts on my behalf. So, even
after a class is certified, an agreement between the named plaintiffs
and the defendant cannot bind the members of the class. Even
though the named plaintiff has been certified as an adequate representative of the class's interests, we know there is no consensual tie
between the representative and those represented. True, a self-appointed representative can initiate a lawsuit and can play a leading
role in a trial that will result in a judgment binding the unnamed
members of the class, but that judgment's binding effect arises not
from consent but from the power vested in the public process of adjudication. A settlement dispenses with that public process, in full or in
part.
Although courts review class settlements for fairness under Rule
23(e) and conduct "fairness hearings" for that purpose, this review is
no substitute for the adjudicatory process. The void created by settlement is not filled. When a court adjudicates a case, it hears the
arguments and evidence on both sides, and it chooses the remedy that
justice requires. The responsibility for the decision on the merits and
for the remedy belongs to the judge and thus to the law. When a
court reviews a settlement, however, it gives great deference to the
parties' choices in the bargaining process and does not exercise its
independent judgment for the remedy. It essentially decides only
whether the settlement is manifestly unjust. In the context of a school
desegregation consent decree, for example, a court of appeals dictated that when a trial court decides whether a settlement is fair, the
trial court must make sure only that the settlement "did not initiate or
authorize any clearly unconstitutional activities [and] is thus not per
se inappropriate.'" Fairness review circumscribes the options available to the people at the bargaining table-the named plaintiff and the
38 This is even more true in practice than in theory. See Coffee, supra note 3, at
389 ("[O]nce a potential settlement of complex litigation is in view, federal trial
courts tend to tolerate almost any conflict in order to achieve a settlement that brings
litigation peace-but at a cost paid by the class members."); id. at 438 ("Although
many reforms are possible and could succeed, only one is sure to fail: reliance on trial
court scrutiny of the settlement.").
39 Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 322 (7th Cir. 1980).
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defendant plus their lawyers-but the agreement's authority still
arises from consent, not adjudication.
The 2002 Advisory Committee addresses these problems, but
none of its proposals for amending Rule 23(e) solves them. The
amendments require an explicit finding by the judge that the settlement is, to use the standard formula, "fair, reasonable, and adequate,"
and they require disclosure of any side agreements made by the parties. The 2003 amendments also require, in the context of (b) (3) actions, that a second round of notice of the proposed settlement be
sent to all members of the class who are to be bound by the agreement. The judge reviewing the settlement and directing the notice is
even allowed to confer on the absent class members a right to opt out
of the settlement. Such changes might well prod the courts toward a
closer scrutiny of settlements, and for that reason might be entirely
commendable; but such scrutiny of a settlement cannot convert the
approval of the settlement into a judgment on the merits of the case.
The conceptual gap between settlement and judgment persists.
Because the authority of a settlement arises from the consent of
those who agree to it, such people are the only ones who should be
bound by a settlement. One consents to a settlement in a class action
by the same method that one consents to other contracts-signing on
the dotted line. A person cannot become bound by a contract merely
because he was sent a letter and failed to respond. The same should
be true for settlements in class actions, even if, as the 2003 amendments provide, the members of the class have a second chance to respond and thus to opt out. Even more obviously, persons cannot be
bound by a contract merely because other persons-even if they are
members of the same class-have agreed to it. Consent in contracts is
an individualized matter, and so too should it be in settlements. A
settlement, after all, is nothing more than a contract. As a practical
matter, this means that after notice of the settlement is sent, the settlement will bind only those who reply to the notice and affirmatively
consent to the agreement-those who opt in.
We recognize that such a change in the default rule would have
profound effects on the prevalence of settlements because most people will not reply to any letter they might receive about a proposed
settlement. If the default rule were to exclude the non-responders
from the settlement, then settlement would appeal less to plaintiffs'
lawyers, who would be reaping a percentage of a much smaller pie.
Many fewer class members would be included in the settlement, so the
amount recovered would be much lower. Settlement would also appeal less to defendants, because they could not use it as a shield to
preclude all class members from suing in the future. Only those who

1450

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 78:5

opt in would be precluded. The only way that defendants could

achieve the preclusion they seek, and the only way that plaintiffs' lawyers could reap huge monetary rewards for their efforts, is by fully
litigating the cases.
We do not recoil at creating such obstacles to class action settlements. Even though settlement can conserve the resources of courts
and parties, it has led to intractable problems in the class action context. For one thing, it heightens the risk of collusion between defendants and the named plaintiffs lawyers. 40 Because of the adversarial
void, it is very difficult for courts to monitor the settlements and weed
out collusion. This is true under the pre-amendment rule and will
remain true under the 2003 amendments, which for the most part,
though not entirely, codify existing practice. Second, defendants
complain that they settle many frivolous class lawsuits because a loss
would be too costly to risk. They often find themselves paying large
amounts in settlement even though they did nothing wrong. Plaintiffs
exploit this advantage by filing lawsuits that are not likely to prevail on
the merits, but that they count on being settled. If settlements were
confined to those who opt in, plaintiffs would lose their incentive to
bring class lawsuits that are unlikely to prevail at trial. Trials are
costly, and plaintiffs' lawyers, engaged on a contingent basis, would
invest their time and cover the ongoing costs of discovery and trial
only if they had a reasonable chance to win. This would reduce the
number of meritless class lawsuits.
CONCLUSION

Rule 23 is not a statute. Although the rule was promulgated
under a scheme set in place by a congressional statute (the Rules Enabling Act) ,'41 the rule itself was not passed by both houses of Congress
and signed by the President and thus did not comply with the mini42
mum constitutional requirements for the enactment of a statute.
Under the enabling statute, Congress has an opportunity to reject
whatever rules are transmitted before they become effective, but the
Constitution does not permit legislation by inaction.
Rule 23 is not a judicial decision, either. Although the Supreme
Court transmitted the rule's 1966 revisions to Congress, the Court did
not engage in the usual procedures-briefs, arguments, opinions40 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852-53 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 827-30 (1997).
41 Rules Enabling Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 961 (1948) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, 2076 note, 2077 (2000)).
42 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

20031

CLASS

ACTION

RULE

that surround the exercise of the judicial power. Indeed, out of respect for the case-and-controversy requirement of Article III of the
Constitution, some of the Justices on the bench in 1966 refused to
pass on the merits of the proposed rules and treated their transmis43
sion of the rules to Congress as purely ceremonial.
There is language in a recent Supreme Court decision suggesting
that Rule 23 might be viewed as an administrative regulation, 4 4 but
that strikes us as far fetched. To view Rule 23 in this way would require us to conceive of the Judicial Conference of the United Statesthe institution charged by Congress with the review of the rules, and
the one that transmitted the 1966 revisions to the Supreme Court-as
an administrative agency. The Judicial Conference consists of the
Chief Justice of the United States, the chiefjudge of each circuit, and
a representative of each district court. These officials do not possess
the attributes associated with the persons traditionally empowered to
promulgate administrative regulations-persons such as the Commissioners of the FTC or FCC or members of the NLRB. The members of
the Judicial Conference are not members of, or in any way tied to, the
Executive Branch. They are judges, appointed to exercise power
under Article III. As a result, no one thought it remotely appropriate
for the Judicial Conference to follow the procedures prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act 45 when it considered the 1966 revisions.
Neither the public nor any interested party had any opportunity whatsoever to participate in the deliberations of the Judicial Conference,
much less in those of the Advisory Committee.
For these reasons, Rule 23 lacks the force of law, as that term is
ordinarily understood. The rule is but a guideline or rule of thumb
whose force derives only from consistent practice and the wisdom that
the rule embodies. As a product of the 1966 revisions, Rule 23 represents a substantial advance over the 1938 rule. Still, given its formal
legal status, it should be open to more thoroughgoing and recurrent
revision than it has been. We are struck by the fixity of Rule 23.
Over the last thirty-five years, use of the class action has provoked
heated debates in political and professional circles. Those debates
have not produced any changes of note. As a result of the 1998
43 Some Justices were explicit in their opposition to the procedures used in
promulgating the rules. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 374 U.S. 861, 865-66 (1963) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
Others, like Justice Brennan, acquiesced in the procedures, but understood the

Court's transmission to Congress as purely a formal gesture.
44
45

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 386-93 (1989).
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2000)).
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amendments, a new section was added to grant the courts of appeals
the discretion to review district court orders granting or denying certification. This amendment might result in the development of a fuller
body of appellate decisions on class actions, but it is unlikely to result
in a reconsideration of the fundamental structure of the rule. 46 In
September 2002, the Advisory Committee placed a set of proposals for
reform before the Judicial Conference of the United States. They
have cleared the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court and may
well eventually go into force, and though they have much to recommend them, they never address the fundamental questions of structure. The 2003 revisions thus represent a missed opportunity for
reconsideration of the architecture of Rule 23. It is our hope, however, that they might open the possibility of a process of reconsideration and ultimately permit reform of the existing structure of the 1966
rule.
At the heart of our proposed revision is an emphasis on the
unique form of representation entailed in a class action-interest representation. We embrace interest representation but at the same time
appreciate its inherent dangers and anomalous character. In cases
like Eisen, class actions are necessary for private enforcement of laws
46 Aside from the 1998 amendment, on only one other occasion over the last
thirty-five years, namely the 1996 amendments, has the Advisory Committee proposed
revision, and those amendments never made it through the Judicial Conference.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRAIrcE & PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFTr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS-O THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19-56
(1996). The 1996 amendments (1) permitted appeals of class action certification decisions, id. at 44, 55-56; (2) allowed courts to certify under (b) (3) class actions that
were to be settled even though the requirements of (b) (3) could not be satisfied if the
case were to be tried, id. at 43, 51-53; and (3) added two factors to the checklist
provided in (b) (3) to determine whether a class action was a superior mechanism for
adjudicating the claim. Id. at 41-42, 45-51.
The first proposal was renewed in the 1998 amendments and now is embodied in
Rule 23(f). The second proposal, aimed at accommodating the "settlement class,"
provoked an outcry in the profession, largely for the reason set forth in this Article.
The third proposal moved Rule 23 in two contradictory directions and arguably was
rejected for that reason. One revision would have required the trial judge, in trying
to assess the advantages of proceeding on a class basis (as required by (b) (3)), to
determine "whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs
and burdens of class litigation." Id. at 42 (proposing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (F)).
Unfortunately, this would have given power to judges to deny certification in situations where the public as opposed to the individual value of the class proceeding was
great (because of the magnitude of the harm to the class as a whole). That directive
was to some extent at odds with another directive to be added to the (b) (3) checklist,
which required judges to favor class actions when "the practical ability of individual
class members to pursue their claims without class certification" was limited. Id. at
41-42 (proposing FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) (A)).
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aimed at protecting the public, and there is virtually no risk of inadequate representation. But in other contexts, class actions are unwarranted. Specifically, we disavow defendant classes and also classes in
which members have opposing interests, as is true of class actions now
contemplated by (b) (1). Mass tort cases pose some of the most difficult questions because the public value of the class action is great, but
so is the danger of inadequate representation. They should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, according to the new class action rule we
have proposed.
Our new rule would drop the categorization scheme of the current section (b), as well as the scheme's linkage of notice, intervention, and opt-out provisions to the (b) (3) category of class action. We
endorse a set of requirements for all class actions, including the predominance and superiority requirements now part of (b) (3). We also
apply to all class actions the special protective devices currently applied only to (b) (3) suits-notice, opt-out, and intervention. Although we explicitly acknowledge that notice need not be sent to
every class member, we make notice a mandatory requirement in all
class actions and do not restrict opt-out and intervention to particular
categories of class action. The purpose of these devices is not to construct a consensual tie between the named plaintiff and the members
of the class-none exists-but to insure the adequacy of the interest
representation provided by the named plaintiff. In further acknowledgment of the special character of the representational tie between
the named plaintiff and the absent class members-it arises from
identity of interest, not consent-we require class members to assent
affirmatively to a settlement (to opt in) before it can become binding
on them and foreclose their right to a day in court.
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